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For Whom the Statute Tolls: Medical Malpractice
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act
David L. Abney*
Determining the proper accrual date for a medical malpractice
action under the Federal Tort Claims Act can be a difficult and ex-
asperating experience.1 The federal version of the medical mal-
practice discovery doctrine states that the cause of action accrues
when the victim knows both that there has been an injury and its
cause. This deceptively laconic formula has engendered a series of
subsidiary doctrines such as concealment, blameless ignorance,
continuous treatment, duty of inquiry, constructive knowledge,
delayed manifestation, and suspicion of harm.
This article will discuss the general accrual standards of the
Federal Tort Claims Act and the special rules relating to medical
negligence cases, including the requirements and theories for toll-
ing of the statute of limitations. Irrespective of appellation, each
approach is basically an attempt to determine when the injured per-
son knew enough to file a claim for damages with the federal gov-
ernment. Judges and claimants who realize this may ascertain more
accurately whether the cause of action is indeed barred under fed-
eral law.
I. The General Statute of Limitations Standard
The Federal Tort Claims Act 2 (FTCA) makes the United States
liable in tort "in the same manner and to the same extent as a pri-
vate individual under the circumstances." 3 The state where the
* Lieutenant, Judge Advocate General Corps, United States Naval Reserve; B.A.,
1980, J.D., 1983, University of Arizona.
I The chronic headaches of one tort claimant began in 1962: "They continue to this
day-the pain amplified by the dismissal of her suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act as
barred by the statute of limitations." Harrison v. United States, 708 F.2d 1023, 1024 (5th
Cir. 1983) (suppression of critical medical records by the government tolled the statute of
limitations).
2 The Federal Tort Claims Act is an interrelated set of laws governing tort claims and
suits against the federal government. The primary statutes are: 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) (1982)
(exclusive federal district court jurisdiction over tort lawsuits); 28 U.S.C. § 1402 (1982)
(venue); 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1982) (statute of limitations); 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982) (jury
trial unavailable); 28 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982) (judgment interest); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)
(court costs and fees); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982) (tort claim substantive rules, proce-
dures, and exceptions). For an overview of the FTCA, see generally L. JAYSON, HANDLING
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES (1985); 35 AM. JUR. 2D
Federal Tort Claims Act 291 (1967 & Supp. 1985).
3 27 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). Most of the exceptions to coverage are found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680 (1982).
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negligent act or omission occurred supplies the substantive tort
law.4 The statute of limitations, however, is federal. 5 Under the
FTCA, a tort claim against the United States is forever barred "un-
less it is presented to the appropriate Federal agency within two
years after such claim accrues." 6 Federal law also governs the de-
termination of when a claim accrues for a personal injury action
brought under the FTCA.7
Unfortunately, Congress has never addressed the question of
when a claim "accrues" against the United States.8 In resolving the
accrual problem, federal courts have begun with the basic justifica-
tions for a time limit on bringing suit: preservation of evidence,
accessibility of witnesses, and prevention of fraudulent claims.9
4 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 269 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)
(conflict of laws problem arising from crash of interstate airline flight).
5 See, e.g., Poindexter v. United States, 647 F.2d 34, 36-37 (9th Cir. 1981) (federal two
year statute of limitations preempts Arizona law governing injured worker's suit against
third party). See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R. FED. 482 (1976 & Supp. 1985) (statute of limita-
tions under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).
6 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1982). The statute continues, "or unless such action is begun
within six months of the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final
denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented." There are thus two limitations
periods for any FTCA claim. This article focuses on the first statute of limitations when the
medical malpractice claim initially accrues, and the tolling of the first statute of limitations.
However, it is important to keep in mind that a valid claim may still be lost by failing to file a
timely suit in federal court after agency denial of the administrative claim. See, e.g., McDuf-
fee v. United States, 769 F.2d 492, 493-94 (8th Cir. 1985) (FTCA medical malpractice com-
plaint untimely when filed six months and one day after agency denial); Kollios v. United
States, 512 F.2d 1316 (1st Cir. 1976) (vehicular accident FTCA damages suit barred when
complaint filed six months and one day after mailing date of final denial notice); Murray v.
United States Postal Serv., 569 F. Supp. 794 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (untimely filing of slip-and-
fall FTCA suit). But see Rodriguez v. United States, 382 F. Supp. I (D.P.R. 1974) (FTCA
complaint filing period runs from the day after mailing of administrative denial up to and
including the same calendar date six months later).
7 United States v. LePatourel, 593 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1976) ("When a particular claim
'accrues' within the meaning of the FTCA is a qustion of Federal law .... ). See also Woll-
man v. United States, 637 F.2d 544, 551 (8th Cir. 1980) (Adams, CircuitJ., dissenting) (in
FTCA automobile accident claim, lack of knowledge that tortfeasor was government em-
ployee did not toll the statute of limitations).
8 Guidance is lacking both in the legislation and relevant legislative reports. See, e.g.,
S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); H.R. REP. No. 276, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1226; S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2515; H.R. REP. No. 1532, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966).
9 In Lee v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 883 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), the court noted:
Statutes of limitation are enacted on the theory that a defendant ought not to be
called upon to defend even against a just claim where "evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared," Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788
(1944), or where a lapse of time is such as to encourage or facilitate fraudulent
claims. The chief purposes in setting the limitation period are, in fairness to de-
fendants, to try to assure them they will not be required to meet a claim at so late a
date that their defense is likely to be compromised, and, in fairness to plaintiffs, to
afford them a reasonable opportunity to make their claims. The same concerns
19861
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Normally, a federal tort cause of action accrues when there has
been an invasion of a legally protected interest of the plaintiff.10 In
FTCA actions charging negligence, accrual generally occurs when
the harm or injury is inflicted."1 Since the FTCA is a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity, courts tend to strictly construe the limitation pe-
riod set by Congress. 12 One consequence of this demanding
judicial attitude is that the statute of limitations is extremely hard to
toll once it begins to run, and it is difficult to prevent the initial
early accrual of the claim.13
In fact, compliance with the two year statute of limitations is
necessary to give the federal district court subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the case. 14 Since the defense of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived, the district court has the continuing
duty to dismiss any FTCA action whenever it appears that jurisdic-
tion is lacking. 15 Once the government shows that suit is untimely
on the face of the pleadings, "the burden of establishing an excep-
tion to the statute of limitations is on the plaintiff."' 6 This burden
are relevant to a determination of when the limitation period should begin to run.
Rationally to decide upon both the limitation period and the time when the claim
"accrues" thus involves the weighing of a variety of factors, including the nature of
the claim, the consequent probable degree of permanence of the evidence, and the
time when the injured person is likely to learn of the claim to be in a position to
assert it.
Id. at 885-86.
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 889 comment c (1979).
11 See, e.g., Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1979) (statute of
limitations barred suit against FAA for negligent infliction of electrical shock); Targett v.
United States, 551 F. Supp. 1231, 1236-37 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (timely suit for postdischarge
failure to warn of military service radiation exposure dangers).
12 See, e.g., Scott v. Casey, 562 F. Supp. 475, 480 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (FTCA suit over
wrongful participation in prison medical experiment). But see Raymer v. United States, 609
F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (FTCA suit alleging negligence in V.A. trauma treatment
held timely). In Raymer, the court stated that "when Congress has permitted suit, the courts
have viewed the conditions imposed with an eye to providing the type of effective relief that
Congress intended." Id. at 1339.
13 See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985) (equity will not toll
the FTCA statute of limitations); Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 624 (2d Cir.
1980) (the FTCA two year statute is not tolled by minority of claimant), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
908 (1981); Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339, 1342 (10th Cir. 1976) ("Insanity, such
as constitutes a legal disability in most states, does not toll the statute of limitations under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.").
14 See, e.g., Ashley v. United States, 413 F.2d 490, 492 (9th Cir. 1969) (medical malprac-
tice suit for damage to nerve incurred in drawing blood sample barred by noncompliance
with the FTCA statute of limitations).
15 "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." FED. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3). See also Garrett v. United States, 640 F.2d 24, 26 (7th Cir. 1981) (statute on
wrongful death suit began to run at date of death and not date of release of autopsy report
by the Bureau of Prisons).
16 Drazan v. United States, 762 F.2d 56, 60 (7th Cir. 1985) (suit arising from alleged
failure to conduct follow-up examination by the V.A.).
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is especially heavy for victims of medical malpractice, who may be
unaware for many years that they have been injured tortiously and
who caused the harm. 17
II. The Kubrick Standard
United States v. Kubrick 18 is the only United States Supreme
Court decision explaining when a medical malpractice claim ac-
crues under the FTCA.' 9 In April 1968, Veterans' Administration
doctors employed the antibiotic neomycin on William Kubrick in
conjunction with surgery on his right femur. About six weeks after
discharge from the hospital, Kubrick noticed a ringing sensation in
his ears and a hearing loss. By January 1969, medical specialists
had informed him it was highly possible the neomycin treatment
had caused bilateral nerve deafness. 20
Since Kubrick was already receiving a government disability
pension for a back injury, he filed for a benefits increase due to the
deafness. The Veterans' Administration denied his application in
September 1969, asserting that Kubrick's care had been proper and
that the neomycin had not generated the deafness. On June 2,
1971, a medical doctor specifically told Kubrick that "the neomycin
had caused his injury and should not have been administered." 2 1
The V.A. turned down his disability appeal in August 1972.
Kubrick filed suit in federal district court the next month,22 and
won this lower court case on the merits.23
In the district court, the United States unsuccessfully asserted
17 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 comment e (1979) (growing accept-
ance of discovery rule in medical malpractice actions).
18 444 U.S. 111 (1979). Discussions of the Kubrick opinion may be found in Case Com-
ment, Accrual of a Medical Malpractice Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act-Accrual of Medical
Malpractice Action: United States v. Kubrick, 4 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 155 (1981); Case Com-
ment, Federal Tort Claims Act-Lack of Reason to Know of Possible Medical Malpractice Claim Does
Not Toll the Statute of Limitations: United States v. Kubrick, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1428
(1980).
19 See In re Swine Flu Prod. Liab. Litig., 764 F.2d 637, 639 (9th Cir. 1985) (government-
sponsored swine flu vaccine allegedly killed female recipient).
20 444 U.S. at 113-14.
21 Id. at 114. The trial judge agreed that the treating physician had "violated the stan-
dard of care imposed upon him by law because he administered excessive quantities of
neomycin to the plaintiff over an extended period of time through an imperfectly function-
ing hemovac tube system, and also because he failed to utilize polycillin (ampicillin) or
penicillin, the true drugs of choice in the situation, given the ototoxic hazards of neomy-
cin." Kubrick v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 166, 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
22 435 F. Supp. at 170. Kubrick did not file a proper FTCA administrative claim until
January 1973. A complaint filed before the administrative claim is properly submitted and
considered does not give subject matter jurisdiction to the district court. See, e.g., Reynolds
v. United States, 748 F.2d 291, 292 (5th Cir. 1984) (prematurely filed FTCA complaint
mandates dismissal of action). The administrative issue in Kubrick was not raised on appeal.
444 U.S. at 115 n.4.
23 435 F. Supp. at 189.
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that the two year statute of limitations barred Kubrick's claim since
he had noticed by January 1969 that neomycin caused his hearing
loss. 24 The trial judge acknowledged the general rule that a claim
accrues under the FTCA when "the claimant has discovered, or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the
acts constituting the alleged malpractice." 25 The court concluded
that a reasonably diligent plaintiff could toll the statute upon "es-
tablishing that there was no reasonable suspicion that there was
negligence in his treatment." 26 Despite reasonable diligence, the
court held that Kubrick had not "known" of the malpractice until
his visit to a medical specialist in June of 1971, less than two years
before presenting his tort claim. 27 The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals agreed that "if the plaintiff can prove that in the exercise of
due diligence he did not know, nor should he have known, facts
which would have alerted a reasonable person to the possibility that
the treatment was improper, then the limitation period is tolled." 28
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and re-
versed the decision. 29 Writing for the majority, Justice White
stressed the importance of the federal statute of limitations in en-
couraging the prompt presentation of claims against the govern-
ment. He could find no support for the concept that the statute
tolled until the victim discovers he has been legally wronged.30 Jus-
tice White held that the statute of limitations begins to run when
the victim knows both that he has been injured and who caused the
harm.31 His reasoning on the issue may best be shown by setting
out two frequently quoted passages from the opinion:
We are unconvinced that for statute of limitations purposes a
plaintiffs ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the
fact of his injury or its cause should receive identical treatment.
That he has been injured in fact may be unknown or unknow-
able until the injury manifests itself; and the facts about causa-
tion may be in the control of the putative defendant, unavailable
to the plaintiff or at least very difficult to obtain. The prospect is
not so bleak for a plaintiff in possession of the critical facts that
he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury. He is no
longer at the mercy of the latter. There are others who can tell
him if he has been wronged, and he need only ask. If he does
ask and if the defendant has failed to live up to minimum stan-
24 444 U.S. at 115.
25 435 F. Supp. at 180.
26 Id. at 185.
27 Id. at 185-86.
28 Kubrick v. United States, 581 F.2d 1092, 1097 (3d Cir. 1978).
29 444 U.S. at 125.
30 Id. at 118-25.
31 Id. at 122.
[Vol. 61:696
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dards of medical proficiency, the odds are that a competent doc-
tor will so inform the plaintiff.
We thus cannot hold that Congress intended that "accrual"
of a claim must await awareness by the plaintiff that his injury
was negligently inflicted. A plaintiff such as Kubrick, armed
with the facts about the harm done to him, can protect himself
by seeking advice in the medical and legal community. To ex-
cuse him from promptly doing so by postponing the accrual of
his claim would undermine the purpose of the limitations stat-
ute, which is to require the reasonably diligent presentation of
tort claims against the Government .... Of course, he may be
incompetently advised or the medical community may be di-
vided on the crucial issue of negligence, as the experts proved
to be on the trial of this case. But however or even whether he
is advised, the putative malpractice plaintiff must determine
within the period of limitations whether to sue or not, which is
precisely the judgment that other tort claimants must make.3 2
Justice White found that Kubrick knew of his injury and its
cause by January 1969, and that reasonable inquiry on his part
would have disclosed the impropriety of his medical treatment at
that point. 33 The complexity of the case would not excuse
Kubrick's dilatoriness, and the claim was therefore barred by the
statute of limitations.3 4
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the statute does not be-
gin to run "until after fair notice of the invasion of the plaintiff's
legal rights."35 He would have preferred to have placed the accrual
date at the point a diligent plaintiff knows the injury was due to
misconduct.3 6 Since the district court had already decided that the
plaintiff had exercised "all kinds of reasonable diligence," Justice
Stevens objected to the de novo majority determination that
Kubrick was not in fact diligent in pursuing his claim.3 7
III. Defining Terms
Kubrick established the general rule that a medical malpractice
action under the FTCA accrues when the victim knows both the
cause of his injury and the person who caused it. The terms and
concepts of this formula have accumulated a judicial gloss which is
32 Id. at 122-24 (footnote omitted).
33 Id. at 122-23.
34 Id. at 124-25.
35 Id. at 125-26 (StevensJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined in dissent byJustices
Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 125.
36 Id. at 126-28.
37 Id. at 128-29 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White did acknowledge the dissent's
criticism that the majority was deciding a question of fact. However, Kubrick's admitted
diligence in finding the cause of his injury did not excuse his omission to seek timely legal
advice. Id. at 123 n.1O.
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useful in applying the tort accrual standard in practice. The most
basic element is "knowledge." The crucial facts which must be
known are the cause of injury, the identity of the tortfeasor, and the
existence of the injury.
A. Knowledge
A federal tort claimant has knowledge sufficient to start the two
year limitations period when he is "in possession of the critical facts
that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury." 38 Merely
defining knowledge as "possession" of certain facts is not very
helpful. The critical question is what an individual person does or
should "know" under given circumstances. As several courts have
suggested, the concept of knowledge encompasses a spectrum of
comprehension ranging from mere belief through suspicion to cer-
tainty. At some point, enough is comprehended to say that the vic-
tim should be held accountable for filing a claim.
The Fifth Circuit recently considered a case in which the suffi-
ciency of the claimant's knowledge was a central concern. In Harri-
son v. United States,39 Air Force physicians negligently punctured
Sybil Harrison's thalamus while conducting a ventriculogram in
1966. In the following years, Harrison suffered excruciating
chronic headaches. Repeated examinations and treatments failed to
disclose the true cause of her problem. Harrison suspected that her
doctors had done something wrong in 1966, but no medical expert
would agree with her. She hired an attorney who was finally able to
obtain the records of the ventriculography after several years of
persistent requests and diligent searches. When they arrived in
1976, the records easily revealed the 1966 malpractice, and Harri-
son promptly filed her FTCA claim.40
The district court ruled that Harrison's suspicions were suffi-
cient to start the statute of limitations running long before she
presented her claim. The appellate court reversed and remanded,
concluding that mere belief or suspicion was insufficient to accrue a
federal tort claim. 4 1
38 444 U.S. at 122. See also Jackson v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 1149, 1152-53 (E.D.
Ark. 1981) ("critical facts" of medical negligence concealed by Veterans' Administration
personnel), afd without opinion, 696 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1982).
39 708 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1983).
40 Id. at 1023-27.
41 Id. at 1027-28. In reaching this result, the court stated:
In assessing the awareness required to trigger the statute of limitations, it is
essential to distinguish between "knowledge" and "belief." For one to have
knowledge of fact "x," three requisities must exist: (1) "x" must be true, (2) the
person must believe "x" to be true, and (3) the belief must be reasonably based.
A. Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy (1979); A. Quiton, "Knowledge and Belief," Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy (1967). "Belief," which is a component of knowledge, requires
[Vol. 61:696
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B. Suspicion, Possibility, or Mere Belief
Noting that "[sluspicion and knowledge are poles apart on a
continuum of understanding," 42 the Fifth Circuit in Harrison de-
cided "it would be unreasonable to hold Harrison to a higher de-
gree of medical competence and understanding than the many
medical experts she consulted." 43 Her privately conceived notion,
belief, or suspicion that government doctors had wrongfully in-
jured her did not turn into "knowledge" until she actually gained
access to the incriminating medical records. 44
While not a medical malpractice case, one of the most enlight-
ened discussions of "knowledge" relating to the FTCA statute of
limitations may be found in Allen v. United States,45 a 1984 decision
of the United States District Court for the District of Utah. In that
case, Judge Jenkins was faced with suits by a group of plaintiffs who
claimed that the Nevada above-ground nuclear tests by the Atomic
Energy Commission had caused their cancer and leukemia. Their
afflictions did not become apparent immediately after the atomic
tests. Judge Jenkins decided that "the Kubrick standard readily
lends itself to a case such as this, in which the injury does not mani-
fest itself until years-sometimes decades-later and in which the
critical facts concerning injury or causation are difficult if not im-
possible to early ascertain." 46 Accrual of the statute of limitations
would hinge on knowledge by the lay plaintiffs that ionizing radia-
tion could induce cancer. Some of the plaintiffs knew in a general
way of a possible connection between radiation and sickness, but
"hard information" was quite "minimal," and often contradicted by
reassurances from the federal government that there was no
danger.47
only requisites (1) and (2)--"x" must be true and the person must believe it to be
true. As a consequence, conclusions based on dreams, intuitions, suspicion, con-
jecture, ESP, speculation, or faulty reasoning, even if true, are merely "belief."
Absent a reaonsable basis, these conclusions do not rise to the level of
"knowledge."
Id. at 1027.
42 Id., quoting Tracerlab, Inc. v. Industrial Nucleonics, 313 F.2d 97, 102 (1st Cir. 1963)
(in misappropriation of trade secrets action summary judgment was inappropriate when
there was a genuine issue of fact whether plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to accrue the
statute of limitations).
43 708 F.2d at 1028.
44 Id. The court was also concerned about fraudulent concealment of the malpractice
by Harrison's physicians, although that issue was not resolved in view of the appellate deci-
sion in the plaintiffis favor on other grounds. Id. at 1026, 1028 n.1. See also notes 107-15
infra and accompanying text (concealment and misdirection by the government).
45 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984). See also Allen v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 476
(D. Utah 1981) (same case on preliminary motions). The Allen decision is examined fully in
Note, Allen v. United States: Discretion Defined Downwind, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 435.
46 588 F. Supp. at 341.
47 Id. at 342-43.
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Judge Jenkins concluded that mere suspicion was not the
"knowledge" necessary under Kubrick to start the limitations clock.
The reasoning of Judge Jenkins as he worked out guidelines for
distinguishing the "crucial difference" between suspicion and
knowledge merits quotation at length:
"Knowledge" speaks to the direct interaction between the mind
and that which exists-facts, information, truth, understanding.
Suspicion, on the other hand, speaks to the formation of sub-
jective impression or belief.... Knowledge and suspicion are
distinguished from each other by the degree of interplay be-
tween the mind and the facts .... "Knowledge" of "fact" carries
an unmistakable sense of certainty, of objective proof or at least
that the fact "known" is more likely than not. That which is
known can readily be shared with others often by pointing them
to the fact claimed known. This is the basis of our entire law of
evidence, and of "fact-finding" by courts. The court is told and
is shown.
"Suspicion" is inextricably tied to the notion of uncertainty,
to a scarcity of "facts" by which one could "know" rather than
merely imagine or suspect. One suspects that which he cannot
prove, a more intuitive than demonstrative exercise.... A plain-
tiff with the requisite quantum of knowledge (or reason to have
such knowledge) has received-seized, grasped, understood-
facts. Knowledge requires at least a modest factual basis, one to
which the perceptive minds of others may be pointed. 48
Judge Jenkins ruled that the plaintiffs knew too little about their
injuries and their causation to start the statute of limitations run-
ning prematurely.49 He awarded damages to eight of the fallout
victims .50
C. Constructive Knowledge
Federal courts prefer to find that the victim has "actual"
knowledge of the critical facts before concluding that the statute of
limitations has accrued. Although the facts may clearly indicate
malpractice to a medical specialist, many claimants are laypersons
dependent on their malpracticing physicians for candor about and
access to the critical facts.5 1 Moreover, even sophisticated claim-
ants will normally vigorously deny any actual knowledge, leaving
the courts to flounder in a sea of "should haves" and "maybes."
48 Id. at 344-45 (emphasis in original).
49 Id. at 347.
50 Id. at 447-48.
51 See, e.g., Overstreet v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 1098, 1099-1103 (M.D. Ala. 1981),
in which the patient had only a lay familiarity with medical procedures and did not actually
know that the cause of his jaundice and fever was surgical error. His doctors were singu-
larly unmotivated to suggest an iatrogenic cause. See also Overstreet v. United States, 528 F.
Supp. 838 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (same case on the merits).
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For instance, in Jastremski v. United States,5 2 a child suffered brain
damage as a result of a traumatic, negligently managed birth. The
father was a licensed clinical pediatrician who was in the operating
room and assisted in the difficult breach delivery. He knew of the
grand mal seizures occurring shortly after birth and of the boy's
abnormal gait which appeared at age two. The neurological diag-
nosis of cerebral palsey caused by a brain injury immediately before
delivery was not made until two more years had passed. Despite all
of these circumstances, the trial court refused to impute knowledge
to the father when he testified that he did not actually know that the
injury existed or had been negligently caused. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit upheld this determination. 53
At some point, however, the wrong done to the victim involves
matters of such general knowledge that he will be held accountable
under the statute for a failure to promptly pursue his claim. In Scott
v. Casey,54 for example, the plaintiffs ingested LSD and similar com-
pounds as part of a Central Intelligence Agency volunteer prison
study in the late 1950's. Several of the participants sued for medi-
cal malpractice approximately seventeen years after they stopped
taking the drugs, claiming a lack of informed consent and negli-
gently inflicted mental trauma. The district court observed that by
the end of the 1960s, "the general properties of LSD, including its
propensity to cause hallucinations, flashbacks, and personality dis-
orders, had become a matter of public knowledge." 55 This public
awareness, coupled with early symptoms and inconsistencies in the
claimants' stories, led the court to conclude that the suits were in-
deed time-barred. 56
This public awareness approach was followed in Svoboda v.
United States,5 7 a swine flu vaccine case from the Northern District of
Illinois. Although vaccinated in 1976, and aware of consequent vi-
sion and neurological problems by 1981, the plaintiff did not file
suit until 1984. District Court Judge Kocoras granted the govern-
ment's motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion due to delinquent filing. He noted the numerous local swine
flu vaccine cases, the regular reports in the Chicago newspapers,
and the national scientific recognition of the injuries caused by the
vaccination program. This information was sufficient to alert a rea-
52 737 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1984).
53 Id. at 670. But see Fernandez v. United States, 673 F.2d 269, 272 (9th Cir. 1982)
(claim barred when parents did not file a claim for twelve years for alleged malpractice at
birth of son despite having available "all there was to know about the cause of the injury"
soon after its occurrence).
54 562 F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
55 Id. at 479.
56 Id. at 480-83.
57 No. 84-C-2926 (N.D. Ill. April 22, 1985) (available on WESTLAW, DCTU database).
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sonable person that the vaccine may have caused subsequent health
problems, and therefore "sufficient to start the running of the stat-
ute of limitations."5 8
Of course, the existence of public awareness that could supply
critical facts to a potential federal tort claimant is not dispositive on
the accrual issue. In a recent appellate case,59 a district court
granted summary judgment to the government on the ground that
the claimant should have realized within the limitations period that
a swine flu vaccination led to his wife's injuries and ultimate
death.60 The Ninth Circuit held that there was a genuine issue of
material fact concerning the extent of the community knowledge
during the period when the claim would have been timely if filed. 6t
In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals refused to hold a
plaintiff "accountable as a matter of law for press accounts."6 2
Conceding that community awareness might or might not be suffi-
cient to charge the plaintiff with knowledge of the causal connec-
tion between the death and the vaccine, the court determined that
the proper standard "looks not to the likelihood that a plaintiff
would in fact have discovered the cause of his injury if he had only
inquired, but instead focuses on whether the plaintiff could reason-
ably have been expected to make the inquiry in the first place."6 3
D. Duty of Inquiy
The Kubrick opinion stressed the need for an inquiry once the
plaintiff possesses the critical facts of injury and agency.64 The vic-
tim must promptly seek medical and legal advice about the proper
standard of care and whether his care conformed to that standard.
Failure to sue because of improper or incompetent advice will not
toll the statue, although the victim should then have a cause of ac-
tion against his advisors. 65 The duty66 or burden67 of investigation
58 Id. at 5, WESTLAW.
59 In re Swine Flu Prod. Liab. Litig., 764 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1985).
60 The alternate ground for summary judgment was that the claim accrued at death, not
when the cause of the injury was reasonably discovered. Id. at 638. The Ninth Circuit
resolved this issue by adopting the medical malpractice Kubrick discovery rule for wrongful
death actions. Id. at 640. See also notes 138-47 infra and accompanying text.
61 764 F.2d at 641.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 642 n.2.
64 United States v. Kubick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979).
65 Id. at 123-24. The unfortunate consequences of an error caused by mistaken medical
or legal advice will fall on the victim, not on the federal government.
66 Gilbert v. United States, 720 F.2d 372, 375 (4th Cir. 1983) (1980 action against V.A.
for wrongful adjudication of incompetency untimely filed when veteran knew of the wrong-
ful act by the V.A. in 1958).
67 Dessi v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 722, 725 (E.D. Va. 1980) (claim of impotence
allegedly caused by negligent transurethral resection of the prostate at U.S.P.H.S. hospital
barred by untimely filing).
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belongs to the plaintiff, who must exercise reasonable diligence in
the inquiry.68
Whether a plaintiff has investigated the situation with reason-
able diligence depends upon inferences drawn from the unique
facts of each case.69 Despite the specificity of this approach, the
appropriate standard for evaluating reasonable diligence is clearly
objective, and not subjective. If the actual claimant fails to investi-
gate at all, or inquires less diligently than the mythical reasonable
person would in like circumstances, the claim will accrue at the
point when a reasonable inquiry would have uncovered indications
of malpractice. 70
E. Facts of Injury
In many cases, however, the victim may not know that there has
been any injury at all. Although directly traceable to medical negli-
gence, the resulting damage may not become apparent for de-
cades. 7' Since the Kubrick standard presupposes awareness of the
medical harm, justifiable ignorance of injury tolls the statute until
the necessary knowledge is acquired. 72 Mere negligent treatment,
before the actual injury manifests itself, will not start the running of
the statute of limitations. Otherwise, "depending on the gap be-
tween treatment and the occurrence of the injury, a plaintiff could
lose his cause of action before it even arose." 73
Occasionally, a patient will be told that a certain medical proce-
dure or treatment will have inevitable, unpleasant consequences.
This situation arose in Rispoli v. United States,74 where Veterans' Ad-
ministration physicians attempted to close the plaintiff's traumatic
open leg wounds with painful and complex skin grafts and flap ad-
vancement techniques. Despite the subsequent loss of his heel and
parts of his foot, the doctors repeatedly assured Rispoli that his
68 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, No. 84-C-5996 (N.D. Ill.July 16, 1985) (available on
WESTLAW, DCTU database) (failure of plaintiff to promptly prosecute claim for alleged
surgical malpractice did bar the action).
69 See, e.g., Snyder v. United States, 717 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1983) (conflicting infer-
ences over issues of due diligence and constructive knowledge precluded summary
judgment).
70 See, e.g., Arvayo v. United States, 766 F.2d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1985) (failure to
inquire into causes of son's retardation after receiving drastically different diagnoses within
brief period would bar claim by parents for malpractice).
71 This is especially true in the toxic tort and radiation exposure cases. See generally
Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1683, 1684-90 (1983).
72 444 U.S. at 122.
73 Foskey v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 1047, 1068 (D. R.I. 1979) (negligent
nondiagnosis and treatment of seizure disorder led to grand mal seizure resulting in severe
brain damage to child).
74 576 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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problems had been anticipated and that his wounds would heal. Af-
ter many months and several useless operations, Rispoli consulted
an outside plastic surgeon and soon afterward filed an FTCA claim.
The district court rejected the government's statute defense, con-
cluding that the signs of malpractice had been masked by the pre-
dicted "side-effects" of the treatment. 75
The patient possesses the foundational fact of injury when he is
aware or on notice that his condition is beyond the reasonable
range of the anticipated complications.7 6 The victim may know lit-
tle about the ultimate nature of the damage at that point. The fed-
eral courts, however, have consistently held that lack of knowledge
of the injury's permanence, 77 extent, 78 and ramifications 79 will not
toll the statute of limitations.
F. Cause of Injury
Although cognizant of an injury, the victim may still not know
its cause. In broad terms, "the concept of causation embraces
everything that has ever occurred commencing with the ultimate
cause of causes up until the present instant." 80 The causation in-
quiry in FTCA cases is far less nebulous.8 1 Cause in the context of
federal medical malpractice focuses specifically upon the govern-
75 Id. at 1403. See also Burgess v. United States, 744 F.2d 771, 774-75 (11 th Cir. 1984)
(parents unaware that breaking of son's clavicle at birth would result in palsey condition);
Jackson v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (knowledge that stroke
after surgery was an expected complication not necessarily indicative of malpractice), aFld
without opinion, 696 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1982).
76 This may be the rationale behind Green v. United States, 765 F.2d 105 (7th Cir.
1985). In Green, the appellate court ruled that the statute had run on the claim of a veteran
who was afflicted with osteoradionecrosis caused by V.A. radiation therapy for the treat-
ment of oral cancer. Osteoradionecrosis in mild form was an expected side effect of the
radiation therapy. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the victim knew of the injury and
its cause far more than two years before his claim was filed. "Further, the severity of
Green's injuries-the oral hemorrhaging, the development of an oral fistula, the numerous
surgical procedures and the length of his hospitalization-would have caused a reasonably
diligent claimant to seek advice in the medical and legal community." Id. at 108.
77 Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971, 973 (10th Cir. 1980) (claim presented too
late when stria from wrongful prescription of drug were readily apparent for five years
before the claimant acted).
78 Snyder v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 633, 635 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (suit over negligent
percutaneous cordotomy), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 717 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1983).
79 Gustavson v. United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1981) (knowledge of
injury to kidneys started statute running despite uncertainty over ultimate scope of the
damage).
80 Lee v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 883, 887 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (reasonable unaware-
ness of traumatic birth injury meant that delayed claim by parents was still timely).
81 "Once the plaintiff discovers that her injury is probably attributable to some act of
those who treated her, there is no longer any reason to toll the statute of limitations." Price
v. United States, 775 F.2d 1491, 1493 (11 th Cir. 1985) (loss of fetus due to hysterectomy
based upon inaccurate report of nonpregnancy).
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mental acts and neglects the acts giving rise to the injury.8 2
The causal requirement of the Kubrick standard was the central
concern in Drazan v. United States,83 a recent decision of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. In Drazan, a 1979 x-ray revealed the pos-
sibility of a small, treatable tumor in one of the lungs of a tubercu-
loid veteran. Contrary to standard medical practice, there was no
follow-up examination. The next x-ray was not taken until early
1981, when the tumor was already large, cancerous, and fatal within
a month. The decedent's widow requested his medical records in
November of 1981, but delayed filing a proper administrative claim
until September 1983. She thought at first that unavoidable and
untreatable lung cancer had killed her husband. It was not until
months after his demise that she suspected any connection between
his death and the lack of an early, intensive follow-up examination.
The plaintiff argued that she first suspected a possible government
causation in December 1981, when she received her husband's
medical records. The district court dismissed her action, holding
that the claim accrued when she knew that her husband had died,
and that the cause was plainly lung cancer. Since the death oc-
curred in February of 1981, the two year statute had already run by
the time the plaintiff filed her claim.8 4
Writing the appellate panel's cogent opinion, Judge Posner re-
versed the lower court. He noted the justifiable uncertainty about
the true cause of the patient's death:
When there are two causes of an injury, and only one is the gov-
ernment, the knowledge that is required to set the statute of lim-
itations running is knowledge of the government cause, not just
of the other cause.
The district court's approach, if widely adopted, would have
the following rather ghoulish consequence: any time someone
suffered pain or illness or death in a Veterans' Administration
hospital, he (or in the case of death his survivors) would request
his hospital records to see whether diagnosis or treatment might
have played a role in his distress-whether, that is, the harm
might have been "iatrogenic" (doctor-caused). He could not
wait till he had reason to think he had suffered any iatrogenic
harm; the two years might have run. We do not think such be-
havior should be encouraged, or that anything in Kubrick re-
quires us to encourage it....
82 See, e.g., Waits v. United States, 611 F.2d 550, 551 (5th Cir. 1980) (extreme delay in
supplying medical records disclosing negligent treatment tolled the statute of limitations).
See also Utley v. United States, 624 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (delay of three years in
filing claim over allegedly negligent prenatal care permitted when parents had no reason to
suspect that government conduct was the cause of severe birth defects).
83 762 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1985).
84 Id. at 57-58.
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We have not said, however, that the statute of limitations
begins to run when the government cause is known; that would
be inaccurate. It begins to run either when the government
cause is known or when a reasonably diligent person (in the tort
claimant's position) reacting to any suspicious circumstances of
which he might have been aware would have discovered the gov-
ernment cause-whichever comes first.8 5
G. Who Caused the Injury
Although knowledge of the fact of injury and its cause will ordi-
narily disclose who inflicted the damage, there are occasionally situ-
ations where the identity of the tortfeasor is unknown. Under
Kubrick, the statute of limitations does not accrue until the plaintiff
knows who has caused the injury. 86 The lower federal courts have
been very stringent in requiring claimants to diligently investigate
whether they were harmed by an agent or instrumentality of the
federal government. 87 For example, in Flickinger v. United States, 88
the plaintiff suffered a puncture wound to her right foot. She was
treated and sent home by a local hospital. Several days later, the
victim's toes and foot showed purple discoloration and she was very
cold. A nurse practitioner working at a nearby clinic gave assur-
ances that there was no medical problem. When the plaintiff was
seen by a physician four days later, her foot was so diseased that she
lost two toes and sections of ganrenous tissue from the rest of her
foot.89
The plaintiff filed a state court medical malpractice complaint
against the nurse practitioner, more than two years after the inci-
dent, but within the applicable state tort limitations period. The
United States attorney removed the action to federal court because
the nurse practitioner had actually been a United States Public
Health Service employee at the time of the injury. The government
then moved to dismiss the action entirely since the two year federal
tort statute of limitations had run without the filing of an adminis-
trative tort claim.
The district court laid great emphasis on the limited waiver of
85 Id. at 59 (emphasis in original). See also Brazzell v. United States, 788 F.2d 1352 (8th
Cir. 1986), aFfg 633 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Iowa 1985) (medically unconfirmed suspicion of
government fault arising from immediate onset of myalgia after swine flu vaccination was
not sufficient knowledge of injury to accrue statute of limitations); Nicolazzo v. United
States, 786 F.2d 454 (1st Cir. 1986) (cause of injury undiscovered for eight years until
competent nongovernment doctor correctly diagnosed cholesteatoma).
86 444 U.S. at 122.
87 See, e.g., Scott v. Casey, 562 F. Supp. 475,482-83 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (plaintiff possessed
sufficient background information to uncover the fact that the federal government was con-
ducting improper prison drug tests).
88 523 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
89 Id. at 137-.
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sovereign immunity embodied in the FTCA, and on the need to
narrowly construe the limitations period. The court placed the bur-
den on the claimant to uncover the federal agency relationship in a
timely manner, and then dismissed the suit as barred by the statue
of limitations .90
IV. Blameless Ignorance
The Kubrick formula excuses a claimant's "blameless igno-
rance." 91 In order to benefit from this theory, the victim must exer-
cise reasonable diligence to uncover the critical facts concerning his
injury.92 However, as long as the plaintiff is blamelessly ignorant of
his injury or its cause or the true identity of the tortfeasor, the stat-
ute of limitations will not accrue.93 Federal courts have applied the
blameless ignorance concept in a wide variety of circumstances.
Examples of its application include situations where the victim goes
into a coma, where federal agents conceal the government wrong-
doing, and cases in which there is a delayed manifestation of the
injury. In all of these circumstances, it is the government itself
which must bear the blame for at least some of the victim's
ignorance.
A. Coma Cases
The general rule under the FTCA is that inability to file a claim
due to mental incompetency will not toll the statute of limitations. 94
The federal judiciary has created an exception for patients ren-
dered incompetent when the alleged government malpractice
90 Id. at 1375-77. See also Barrett v. Hoffiman, 521 F. Supp. 307, 318-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), rev'don other grounds, Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1131 (1983), a wrongful death action arising from the injection of toxic experi-
mental drugs by a federal agency. Both state and federal entities worked on the project,
although the survivors of this particular victim only knew of the state activities. A federal
claim was finally filed twenty years after the death. The federal district court dismissed the
subsequent action, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to investigate the federal connec-
tion with sufficient alacrity. "Federal precedent supports the proposition that a plaintiff's
ignorance of the identity of a tortfeasor will not excuse a delay of more than two years in
pressing a tort claim against the government." Id. at 319.
91 See, e.g., Dessi v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 722, 726 (E.D. Va. 1980) (plaintiff's
claim barred by failure to make diligent inquiries about the cause of his impotency). See also
Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1980) (suit over heart problems
resulting from unsuspected exposure to nitroglycerine at a federal ammunition plant).
92 See, e.g., Camire v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (claim over
misdiagnosis of child's meningitis barred due to lenthy inaction by parents).
93 See, e.g., DeGirolamo v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 778, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (claim
barred since victim knew of acts amounting to malpractice in treatment of torn cartilage
years before taking action).
94 See, e.g., Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339, 1342 (10th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff's
insanity did not toll statute in claim for damage to sciatic nerve caused by pre-operative
injections).
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which incapacitated them is the basis of the tort claim itself. Several
courts adopted this approach before Kubrick was decided.95 The
first post-Kubrick decision to apply this doctrine was Dundon v.
United States,96 a case from the Eastern District of New York.
At the end of his distinguished service in Vietnam, James
Dundon began to suffer severe depression and headaches. He at-
tempted suicide in 1970. Military and Veterans' Administration
physicians wasted five years treating his symptoms as purely psychi-
atric manifestations. Finally, in the summer of 1975, a proper neu-
rological examination revealed an organic brain tumor or lesion.
An operation in the fall of 1975 failed, and Dundon lapsed into an
irreversible coma. He died in September 1977. His estate and sur-
vivors filed a claim in January 1979, alleging medical malpractice
and wrongful death. After suit was brought in 1980, the govern-
ment moved to dismiss on the ground that the statute had already
run.
9 7
District Judge Bramwell refused to accept the government's ar-
gument that Dundon's mental incompetence would not toll the
statute. The judge noted that this case involved more than "mere
mental incompetency" because Dundon's condition was allegedly
due to the physician's actions which prevented him from under-
standing the cause of his injury.98 Judge Bramwell also rejected the
government's argument that a guardian could have brought suit for
Dundon. Since Dundon was not a minor and had never been de-
clared incompetent, only at the time of his death could a third party
bring a suit to protect his interests. 99 Judge Bramwell found that
the cause was timely and allowed the trial to continue for a determi-
nation on the merits.100
This approach was followed in Pardy v. United States.10' Follow-
ing injection of a diagnostic contrast medium on November 6,
1978, Pardy went into anaphylactic shock followed by a fifteen-day
coma. He did not file a tort claim until November 10, 1980. After
suit was instituted, the government moved to dismiss since more
than two years had elapsed from the date of injury until filing of the
95 See, e.g., Zeidler v. United States, 601 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1979), in which a former
V.A. patient received two lobotomy operations in the late 1940s. The surgical procedures
allegedly destroyed his mental functions. A conservator, appointed in 1975, filed both a
tort admistrative claim and law suit within two years of the appointment. The district court
held that the statute had already run, and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals remanded, refusing to classify brain damage or destruction by the govern-
ment in the same category as routine mental disease or insanity.
96 559 F. Supp. 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
97 Id. at 469-71.
98 Id. at 474.
99 Id. at 475.
100 Id. at 475, 477.
101 575 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ill. 1983).
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claim. ChiefJudge Foreman first concluded that the Kubrick discov-
ery rule does apply "when a plaintiff is rendered incompetent by
the government's allegedly tortious conduct."10 2 Judge Foreman
observed that in almost all cases involving a severe injury to an in-
competent person, the cause of action would accrue at the time of
the injury, since the legal guardian would become aware of the in-
jury when it happened. Since Pardy was competent at the time he
entered the hospital, he was in a different category. Having no
legal guardian to act for him, the statute on Pardy's claim was tolled
until he regained the use of his mental faculties. The government's
motion was denied.10 3
The special rule for a tortiously inflicted coma was adopted by
the Eighth Circuit in Clifford v. United States.104 Allen Clifford took
an overdose of an anti-depressant drug allegedly because of the
malpractice of Veterans' Administration physicians. He became co-
matose in 1976 and remained in that condition throughout the pro-
ceedings. Allen's father was appointed guardian in 1979, and he
filed a proper tort claim within two years. The district court
granted summary judgment to the government, holding that the
two year statute of limitations had expired before the claim was
presented.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded. 05 Judge Arnold rejected the government's argument that
Allen's family and friends should have expeditiously moved to pro-
tect his interests. Since Allen was an emancipated adult, Judge Ar-
nold could find no legal duty for others to act for him before the
appointment of a guardian. This was especially true when the gov-
ernment itself was allegedly to blame for the patient's coma. 0 6
102 Id. at 1080.
103 Id. at 1081.
104 738 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1984).
105 Id. at 978-80.
106 Id. at 979-80. The most persuasive government concern was the danger of being
open to suit for a theoretically indefinite period.
Probably the real exposure of the government to liability would be slight in such
cases, though. The passage of time should make it progressively more difficult for
a plaintiff to prove his case. But however that may be, we are persuaded that the
rule contended for by the government would be still more objectionable. For
under it the government would profit from its own (alleged) wrong. The statute
would begin to run immediately at the time of the overdose. The coma that the
government had (allegedly) negligently caused would prevent the plaintiff from
knowing even that he had been injured, and there would be no one else with a
legal duty to sue.
Id. at 980. The Ninth Circuit has recently accepted the Clifford rationale in this area. Wash-
ington v. United States, 769 F.2d 1436, 1438-39 (9th Cir: 1985) (suit for negligent injection
of spinal anesthetic leading to fourteen year coma and death held timely when instituted by
survivors promptly after death of victim).
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B. Perpetuating the Ignorance
Government agents will often perpetuate the plaintiff's igno-
rance of the critical tort facts. This obfuscation may be intentional
or merely inadvertent. The first hurdle in this regard is obtaining
copies of the medical records in order to ascertain if the applicable
standard of care has been met. 10 7 In many cases, the only reason
there is a statute of limitations problem at all comes from a failure
to rescue records from the "unaccessible hospital files" where the
government has stored them. 08 Of course, the fog may not lift
even when the medical records are obtained. "Anyone who has
seen a volume of hospital and doctors' and nurses' notes would
agree that they are seldom models of clarity." 10 9 However, at the
least, the plaintiff who is armed with some of the basic raw data
through access to the medical records stands a chance of ascertain-
ing if there was an injury and who caused it.
Even when the patient is aware of untoward consequences
from his treatment, he may justifiably be lulled into non-action by
reasonable reassurances from government personnel. A classic ex-
ample of improper assurances may be found in the 1985 decision of
Nemmers v. United States,'10 where Navy doctors ignored plain signs
that a fetus was post-mature. As a result of the late delivery, the
child developed cerebral palsey. Although the parents raised con-
cerns over the boy's poor muscular coordination, three pediatri-
cians and a neurologist assured the parents that "the causes were
unknown and that it was just one of those things and only God
knows the cause."" '  No government doctor suggested any causal
connection between the delayed birth and the child's condition. In
fact, there seemed to be an active effort to hide the truth. The par-
ents fortuitiously uncovered the connection eight years after the
birth, and promptly initiated suit against the federal government. 112
Because of the misdirection provided by the government medical
professionals, the district court held that the suit was timely.1 1l
107 See, e.g.,Jackson v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (plaintiff
unaware of the medical negligence until the V.A. hospital supplied the records).
108 See, e.g., Waits v. United States, 611 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1980) (great delay in
provision of medical records in wrongful amputation precluded accrual of statute of limita-
tions). See also Raymer v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 1332, 1339 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (plain-
tiff's claim for advanced paralysis did not accrue until the crucial medical records were
produced by the V.A.).
109 Overstreet v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (difficulties in
obtaining accurate records prevented early accrual of claim).
110 612 F. Supp. 928 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
111 Id. at 930.
112 Id. at930-31.
113 Id. at 933. See also Burgess v. United States, 744 F.2d 771, 775 (11th Cir. 1984)
(parents acted reasonably in relying upon governmental misrepresentations and assurances
that trauma at birth was unrelated to the manifestation of Erb's Palsey).
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Concerned with the obvious lack of candor of many govern-
ment physicians, several decisions have suggested that doctors are
indeed responsible to their patients for a full, frank explanation of
the scope and probable causes of their injuries. For example, in
Wilson v. United States, 1 4 a young woman was rendered sterile from
an abscess formed in her abdominal cavity secondary to a ruptured
appendix. An administrative claim alleging federal medical mal-
practice was not filed until ten years after her treatment. Neverthe-
less, District Judge Hobbs allowed the case to proceed, since her
treating doctors never told the patient in any meaningful way about
the scope and significance of her injuries. It is settled law that in-
tentional concealment of material facts by the government will toll
the statute of limitations until the victim actually discovers the
truth. 115
C. Delayed Manifestation
The paradigm "blameless ignorance" defense arises where
there is delayed manifestation of the injury. A victim unaware of an
injury because it has not become apparent will not be held respon-
sible for failure to file a claim. 116 In most situations, an injury will
arise immediately following the tortious acts, although a hiatus in
appearances of the harm does occur in many cases. 117 The delayed
manifestation doctrine also has been raised with varying success in
many circumstances on the borderline of true medical malpractice.
Thus, delayed manifestation is often a factor in cases alleging
wrongful radiation exposure, 18 improper vaccinations,119 and tor-
tious chemical or drug tests. 120
114 594 F. Supp. 843 (M.D. Ala. 1984).
115 See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1981) (government agents
actively covered up unconsented army chemical experiment which killed plaintiffs dece-
dent), cert denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983).
116 This is the clear implication of United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979).
117 See, e.g., Arvayo ex reL Arvayo v. United States, 580 F. Supp. 753 (D. Kan. 1984)
(delay in appearance of mental retardation symptoms), rev'd sub nom., Arvayo v. United
States, 766 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1985).
118 See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984) (delayed manifesta-
tion of cancers from open-air atomic testing prevented accrual of action); Targett v. United
States, 551 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (delayed manifestation of cancer arising from
atomic testing precluded dismissal of suit as untimely). But see Timothy v. United States,
612 F. Supp. 160 (D. Utah 1985) (plaintiff fully aware of injury and its probable cause by
radioactive fallout more than two years before administrative claim was filed).
119 See, e.g., In re Swine Flu Prod. Liab. Litig., 764 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1985) (delayed
manifestation factor in swine flu vaccine case); Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328 (9th
Cir. 1981) (delayed manifestation of injury would not toll statute in oral polio vaccine case),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982); Gallick v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Pa. 1982)
(delayed manifestation not applicable in swine flu vaccine case).
120 See, e.g., Bishop v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 66 (D.D.C. 1983) (in action for wrong-
ful injection of test drug, delayed manifestation of injury would not toll statute); Sweet v.
United States, 528 F. Supp. 1068 (D.S.D. 1981) (knowledge of government use of LSD
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V. Special Tolling Doctrines
There are several "special" tolling doctrines which may pre-
vent the FTCA statute of limitations from accruing. They involve
wrongful death claims, continuous treatment, equitable principles,
and the failure to diagnose and treat a preexisting injury. As with
other facets of the Kubrick standard, these varied tolling theories
actually depend in the final analysis upon the level of knowledge
reasonably available to the victim. The validity of these doctrines as
independent theories is therefore questionable, although they may
serve some small useful function in focusing the limitations inquiry
on knowledge.
A. Continuous Treatment
The "continuous treatment" doctrine for tolling the medical
malpractice statute of limitations has been mentioned in several
post-Kubrick cases, although it has not, strictly speaking,' 2 ' been fol-
lowed in any. 122 Under this doctrine, when a physician continues to
treat a patient for the same condition which gave rise to the as-
serted malpractice, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the patient-doctor relationship ends. 123
Several justifications have been proffered for the continuous
treatment theory: "first, it would obviously be both absurd and in-
appropriate to force a claimant to institute suit against either a hos-
pital or physician while still undergoing corrective medical
treatment .... and second, it prevents the concealment by physi-
cians of malpractice acts until the time in which to sue has ex-
pired."1 24 Two opposing ideas seem to be at work in this doctrine;
that a patient should not disturb the confidential therapeutic rela-
tionship between the patient and the doctor, and yet that the physi-
cian may still be apt to conceal the truth about any malpractice from
the gullible, trusting patient. 125
vitiated delayed manifestation assertion by plaintiff), afd, 687 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1982);
Cox v. United States, 513 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Ky. 1981) (plaintiffs early awareness of
problems from government use of LSD prevented delayed manifestation argument).
121 The doctrine was employed as a subsidiary justification in Todd v. United States, 570
F. Supp. 670, 676-77 (D.S.C. 1983) (claim alleging surgical malpractice was timely because
of reasonable, although erroneous, belief that a post-surgery fall caused a debilitating con-
dition known as central cord syndrome).
122 See, e.g., Dundon v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 469, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). See also
notes 96-100 supra and accompanying text.
123 See, e.g., Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d
319 (1962) (first enunciation of the "continuous treatment" doctrine).
124 DeGirolamo v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 778, 780-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (see note 93
supra).
125 See the excellent discussion of the "continuous treatment" doctrine in Kelly v.
United States, 554 F. Supp. 1001, 1003-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (claim for unpleasant gastroin-
testinal side effects of surgical procedures).
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For the doctrine to apply, there must be a personal, confiden-
tial relationship with the physician charged with the malpractice, or
a direct concert between the tortious doctor and succeeding medi-
cal practitioners.1 26 There must also be an ongoing therapeutic re-
lationship, not just an isolated operation or phase of treatment.1 27
Intermittent visits and treatment by independent doctors and hos-
pitals will preclude use of the doctrine. 128 A mere continuing right
to demand further treatment at federal expense is insufficient to
qualify under the continuous treatment theory.1 29 Finally, if the pa-
tient actually knows of the acts constituting malpractice, he cannot
avoid the statute of limitations by asserting that he was under con-
tinuous treatment. 3 0
By enunciating this doctrine and then riddling it with excep-
tions and qualifications, the federal courts have demonstrated its
unsuitability for the Federal Tort Claims Act. There is a clear coun-
tervailing "congressional intent to induce prospective plaintiffs to
investigate possible claims promptly and to sue before evidence be-
comes stale and memories fade."' 3' If care has been negligent,
then any interruption could prove as salutary as harmful. More-
over, if a doctor is concealing vital facts over a course of continuing
treatment, the victim's claim will not accrue until knowledge of the
critical facts is actually obtained. The Kubrick formula seems to ade-
quately cover the continuous treatment scenario without the ex-
cresence of a separate continuous treatment doctrine. 32
B. Failure to Diagnose and Treat a Preexisting Injury
The Ninth Circuit has formulated a tolling doctrine that sup-
posedly lies outside of the Kubrick standard. 3 3 The seminal case is
126 See Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 823 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (dictum) (alleged
damage caused by negligent drug therapy).
127 See, e.g., Roll v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 97, 100-01 n.1 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (early
awareness of untoward consequences of neurectomy precluded claim).
128 See, e.g., Kelly v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (see note
125 supra). See also Otto v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 381 (D. Md. 1986) (medical malprac-
tice claim barred when consultations with private physician and two specialists effectively
terminated the intimate relationship supposedly protected by continuous treatment
doctrine).
129 Mortensen v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 23, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (claim for negligent
care by U.S. Public Health Service untimely).
130 See, e.g., DeGirolamo v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 778, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (see
note 93 supra).
131 Dundon v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 469, 473 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). See notes 96-100
supra and accompanying text.
132 See, e.g., Kelly v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (see note
125 supra).
133 See, e.g., Raddatz v. United States, 750 F.2d 791, 796 (9th Cir. 1984) (alleged negli-
gence of Navy doctors in treating perforation caused by insertion of IUD).
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Augustine v. United States,134 where Air Force dental surgeons failed
to diagnose a cancerous lump in the early treatable stage of devel-
opment on the palate of their patient. The small lump shortly de-
veloped into incurable metastatic cancer. The victim filed a federal
tort claim more than two years after the government negligence,
but less than two years after the development of the mestastatic
condition became apparent. The government argued that the claim
arose when the lump was first examined and its significance
overlooked. 35
The Ninth Circuit saw the situation differently:
Where a claim of medical malpractice is based on the failure to
diagnose or treat a pre-existing condition, the injury is not the
mere undetected existence of the medical problem at the time
the physician failed to diagnose or treat the patient or the mere
continuance of that same undiagnosed problem in substantially
the same state. Rather, the injury is the development of the prob-
lem into a more serious condition which poses greater danger to
the patient or which requires more extensive treatment. In this
type of case, it is only when the patient becomes aware or
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have be-
come aware of the development of a pre-existing problem into a
more serious condition that his cause of action can be said to
have accrued for purposes of section 2401(b).13 6
The court held that the claim was timely filed.13 7
It should be plain that this "doctrine" is simply an application
of Kubrick to a specific brand of malpractice. The focus is indeed
narrowed to a part of the Kubrick standard, namely, the fact of in-
jury. However, the approach is identical: When the victim knows
the fact of injury (the development of a preexisting injury) and has
discovered the critical facts of causation and agency, the cause ac-
crues. There is nothing in the Ninth Circuit's theory that does not
fit comfortably within Kubrick.
C. Wrongful Death
It would seem logical that a cause of action for wrongful death
arising from medical malpractice would accrue, at the earliest, upon
the death of the patient. Nevertheless, government attorneys have
doggedly argued that Kubrick requires a wrongful death cause to
accrue at the same time the cause accrues for the underlying medi-
cal negligence. Thus, if medical malpractice fatally injures a patient
who lingers for three years before death, any claim for wrongful
134 704 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1983).
135 Id. at 1076-78.
136 Id. at 1078 (emphasis in original).
137 Id. at 1079. This approach was noted, although not applied on the facts, in Green v.
United States, 765 F.2d 105, 108-09 (7th Cir. 1985) (see note 76 supra).
[Vol. 61:696
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
death would be barred if the victim knew the critical facts of his
injury soon after its inception. This argument misconstrues both
Kubrick and the tort of wrongful death.
The government contention of pre-death accrual was raised in
the Seventh Circuit case of Fisk v. United States.138 In Fisk, a govern-
ment doctor negligently injected radiopaque dye into a patient's
carotid arteries in 1950. The dye leaked into the soft tissues of the
patient's neck and slowly killed him from complications of pharyn-
geal ulcers and esophageal stenosis induced by dye scarring. The
patient died in 1979 as a direct result of the medical malpractice
committed twenty-nine years earlier.' 39 The government argued
that a medical malpractice claim accrues when the victim knows the
existence of his injury and its cause. Since the victim had discov-
ered these matters by 1973, the claim was barred at his death in
1979. Otherwise, the government contended, the limitations pe-
riod would be stretched to the end of an injured person's life, plus
two years. This would violate the Kubrick discovery rule. 40
The court rejected the government's argument, holding that
two separate claims arose from the wrongful acts: a personal injury
claim and a wrongful death claim. Under the Kubrick rule, the gov-
ernment would remain exposed to the personal injury claim for two
years after it accrued. In addition, the government was also ex-
posed to the wrongful death claim for two years after it accrued, at
the time of the wrongful death. 14' Therefore, the wrongful death
claim was not barred by the statute of limitations.
Fisk was followed in Natale v. United States,' 42 a recent decision
by the District Court for the Southern District of New York. In that
case, Margaret Natale was allegedly the victim of medical negli-
gence for fifteen years in the treatment of her cervical cancer. Her
estate made a wrongful death claim within two years of her death in
January 1980. The plaintiff admitted that the decedent learned of
the alleged malpractice in August of 1978. The government as-
serted that the wrongful death claim was untimely, because it was
138 657 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1981).
139 Id. at 169.
140 Id. at 171.
141 Id. at 171-73. Some state statutes may alter this formula. Several federal courts have
interpreted New York's wrongful death statute, for instance, to mean that "the decedent
must have a valid personal injury claim at the time of death for heirs to maintain a wrongful
death action." Washington v. United States, 769 F.2d 1436, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985) (wrongful
death action following lengthy coma held timely). If the victim's personal injury claim has
accrued more than two years before the death, then the wrongful death claim by the survi-
vors may be barred by the victim's lack of diligence in prosecuting the underlying personal
injury claim. See Dundon v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 469, 475-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (vic-
tim's coma tolled personal injury claim, allowing subsequent wrongful death suit).
142 No. 82 Civ. 8184-CSH (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1985) (available on WESTLAW, DCTU
database).
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not filed by August of 1980, two years after the accrual date of the
personal injury claim. 143
DistrictJudge Haight was not responsive to this argument, rea-
soning that the government had failed to distinguish between com-
mon law malpractice and statutory wrongful death claims. The
wrongful death claim, which incidentally arose from alleged mal-
practice, did not accrue until the patient's death. This was true
even though the medical malpractice claim accrued in August
1978.144 The court denied the government's motion to dismiss
based upon the statue of limitations. 145
The logical extension is to apply Kubrick fully in wrongful death
cases, and find that the cause of action accrues only when the par-
ties entitled to bring a claim discover, in the exercise of due dili-
gence, the critical facts connected with the fatal injury. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, citing "fundamental fairness concerns,"
has extended the medical malpractice discovery rule to wrongful
death cases. 146 Focusing on the easy conclusion that a wrongful
death claim cannot accrue before death, several lower courts have
ruled that a wrongful death claim must accrue at death and can
never accrue later than that point. 147 Of course, that is similar to
holding that a personal injury action always accrues precisely when
the damage becomes manifest, although other critical information
about the injury and its cause is still reasonably unknown. The
Ninth Circuit's approach seems far more in line with the knowledge
criteria enunciated in Kubrick.
D. Tolling on Equitable Principles
It has become a commonplace among federal courts that the
FTCA statute of limitations cannot be tolled by equitable princi-
ples. 148 The only reason given for this constricted attitude is that
courts should strictly construe the limitation period set by Congress
in this narrow statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. 149 In a
143 Id. at 1-4, WESTLAW.
144 Id. at 6-7, WESTLAW.
145 Id. at 9, WESTLAW.
146 See In re Swine Flu Prod. Liab. Litig., 764 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1985); notes 65-69
supra and accompanying text. See also Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1982)
(similar result in case of wrongful injections of mescaline derivative into involuntary test
subject), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983).
147 See, e.g., Lotrionte v. United States, 560 F. Supp. 41, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (claim for
wrongful death barred when presented more than two years after death); Gallick v. United
States, 542 F. Supp. 188, 191 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (in swine flu vaccine case, claim was untimely
when filed two years after death).
148 See, e.g., DeGirolamo v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 778, 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); note
93 supra.
149 See, e.g., Peterson v. United States, 694 F.2d 943, 944-45 (3d Cir. 1982) (claim over
alleged failure to diagnose malignancy and subsequent metastasis).
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broad sense, the Kubrick standard is already capable of accommo-
dating many circumstances that unfairly and inequitably prevent a
medical malpractice victim from learning the critical facts of injury
and causation. 150 If the government unfairly impedes a victim from
filing or pursuing a claim once he possesses the requisite knowl-
edge of government responsibility, there would seem to be suffi-
cient justification for equitably tolling the statute of limitations until
the victim can reasonably undertake the proper course of action
against the United States. However, no court has yet accepted this
analysis. 151
VI. Conclusion
The statue of limitations is critically important to medical mal-
practice federal tort claimants. The causal connection between an
injury and the federal government may remain obscure or hidden
for some time. The injury itself may remain unknown for decades
following the actual medical negligence. The consequent lack of
information will often delay presentation of a valid tort claim be-
yond the apparently proper limitations period. As a result, federal
courts often have to grapple with the slippery and difficult determi-
nation of when the cause of action actually did accrue.
By staying the statute of limitations until the victim knows both
the fact of injury and the causal link to the government, the Kubrick
decision has granted some coherence, fairness, and consistency to
both tort victims and the federal judiciary. The major difficulties
which seem to afflict the courts in this area result from a failure to
define the terms and components of the Kubrick standard, com-
bined with a hesitance to specifically focus on what level of claimant
knowledge must be reached to trigger the running of the statue of
limitations. There is no need for special ancillary doctrines to ame-
liorate this situation. What is needed is a concentration on what the
victim knows or should know about his situation, and when that
knowledge became reasonably available. A realization of this sim-
ple fact would spare considerable anxiety and uncertainty for all
concerned.
150 See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 769 F.2d 1436, 1439 (9th Cir. 1985) (court
tolls statute fourteen years for woman in a coma).
151 See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1985), in which an apparently
incompetent veteran relied in vain upon a Veterans' Administration caseworker to file a
proper claim for compensation against the United States for negligent medical treatment.
When he tried to file a proper tort claim after the two year period had run, the court of
appeals refused to grant any equitable relief. Circuit Judge Reinhardt, in his scathing dis-
sent, could find no support for the majority position in either logic or equity. Id. at 725-29.
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